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Abstract. We study the Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA), a generalisation
of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (HR). An instance of SPA involves a
set of students, projects and lecturers. Each project is offered by a unique lecturer,
and both projects and lecturers have capacity constraints. Students have preferences
over projects, whilst lecturers have preferences over students. We present two optimal
linear-time algorithms for allocating students to projects, subject to the preference and
capacity constraints. In particular, each algorithm finds a stable matching of students
to projects. Here, the concept of stability generalises the stability definition in the
HR context. The stable matching produced by the first algorithm is simultaneously
best-possible for all students, whilst the one produced by the second algorithm is
simultaneously best-possible for all lecturers. We also prove some structural results
concerning the set of stable matchings in a given instance of SPA. The SPA problem
model that we consider is very general and has applications to a range of different
contexts besides student-project allocation.
1 Introduction
In many university departments, students seek to undertake a project in a given field of
speciality as part of the upper level of their degree programme. Typically a wide range
of available projects is offered, and usually the total number of project places exceeds the
number of students, to provide something of a choice. Also, typically each lecturer will
offer a variety of projects, but does not necessarily expect that all will be taken up.
Each student has preferences over the available projects that he/she finds acceptable,
whilst a lecturer will normally have preferences over the students that he/she is willing
to supervise. There may also be upper bounds on the number of students that can be
assigned to a particular project, and the number of students that a given lecturer is willing
to supervise. In this paper we consider the problem of allocating students to projects based
on these preference lists and capacity constraints – the so-called Student-Project Allocation
problem (SPA).
SPA is an example of a two-sided matching problem [25, 1], a large and very general
class of problems whose input includes a set of participants that can be partitioned into
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two disjoint sets A and B (in this case A is the set of students and B is the set of projects),
and we seek to match members of A to members of B, i.e. to find a subset of A×B, subject
to various criteria. These criteria usually involve capacity constraints, and/or preference
lists, for example.
Both historical evidence (see e.g. [12, pp.3-4], [20]) and game-theoretic analysis [23,
25] indicate that participants involved in two-sided matching problems should not be
allowed to construct an allocation by approaching one another directly and making ad
hoc arrangements. Rather, the allocation process should be automated by means of a
centralised matching scheme. Moreover, it has been convincingly argued [23] that, when
preference lists exist on both sides, the key property that a matching constructed by
such schemes should satisfy is that of stability. A formal definition of stability follows,
but informally, a stable matching M guarantees that no two participants who are not
matched together in M would rather be matched to one another than remain with their
assignment in M . Such a pair of participants could come to a private arrangement that
would undermine the integrity of the matching.
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [19] in the US is perhaps the largest
and best-known example of a centralised matching scheme. It has been in operation since
1952, and currently handles the allocation of some 30,000 graduating medical students, or
residents, to their first hospital posts, based on the preferences of residents over available
hospital posts, and the preferences of hospital consultants over residents. The NRMP
employs at its heart an efficient algorithm that essentially solves a variant of the classical
Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) [10, 12]. The algorithm finds a stable matching
of residents to hospitals that is resident-optimal, in that each resident obtains the best
hospital that he/she could obtain in any stable matching.
There are many other examples of centralised matching schemes, both in educational
and vocational contexts (e.g. allocating pupils to secondary schools in Singapore [26],
school-leavers to universities in Spain [22] and trainee teachers to probationary posts in
Scotland). Many university departments in particular seek to automate the allocation of
students to projects [27, 5, 3]. However, as we discuss in greater detail later, an optimal
linear-time algorithm for this setting cannot be obtained by simply reducing an instance of
SPA to an instance of HR. Thus, a specialised algorithm is required for the SPA problem.
In this paper we present two linear-time algorithms for finding a stable matching,
given an instance of SPA. The first algorithm is student-oriented, in that it finds the
stable matching in which each student obtains the best project that he/she could obtain
in any stable matching. The second algorithm is lecturer-oriented, in that it constructs
the stable matching in which each lecturer has as good a set of students (in a precise
sense, to be defined) as in any other stable matching. Our algorithms are applicable in
any context that fits into the SPA model, for example where applicants seek posts at large
organisations, each split into several departments.
As alluded to above, the centralised allocation of students to projects has been consid-
ered previously in the literature. Various models have been constructed that allow student
preferences over projects, but do not permit lecturer preferences [21, 27, 3], so stability is
not relevant in these contexts. However an automated system for allocating students to
projects at the Department of Computer Science, University of York is described [5, 15, 28]
which takes into account student preferences over projects and lecturer preferences over
students. In this model, preference lists may include ties, each project has capacity 1, and
lecturer capacities are unbounded. Constraint programming techniques are utilised in or-
der to find a stable matching with additional properties, such as balancing the supervision
load among lecturers as evenly as possible. The underlying algorithms do not, in general,
run in polynomial time.
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Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1 : p1 p7 l1 : s7 s4 s1 s3 s2 s5 s6 l1 offers p1, p2, p3
s2 : p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 l2 : s3 s2 s6 s7 s5 l2 offers p4, p5, p6
s3 : p2 p1 p4 l3 : s1 s7 l3 offers p7, p8
s4 : p2
s5 : p1 p2 p3 p4
s6 : p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 Project capacities: c1 = 2, ci = 1 (2 ≤ i ≤ 8)
s7 : p5 p3 p8 Lecturer capacities: d1 = 3, d2 = 2, d3 = 2
Figure 1: An instance of the Student-Project Allocation problem.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a formal definition
of the SPA problem is given, followed by some consequences of this definition and a
discussion of relationships between SPA and existing models in the literature. Then, in
Section 3, the student-oriented algorithm for SPA is presented, together with correctness
proofs and an analysis of its complexity. In Section 4 we present some properties of the
set of stable matchings in a given SPA instance and consider the issue of load balancing
students among lecturers. Then in Section 5, we give the lecturer-oriented algorithm, also
establishing its correctness and time complexity. Finally, Section 6 contains a discussion of
the SPA problem model considered in this paper, and also presents some open problems.
2 The Student-Project Allocation problem model
2.1 Definition of the Student-Project Allocation problem
An instance of the Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA) may be defined as follows.
Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} be a set of students, let P = {p1, p2, . . . , pm} be a set of projects,
and let L = {l1, l2, . . . , lq} be a set of lecturers. Each student si supplies a preference list,
ranking a subset of P in strict order. If project pj appears on si’s preference list, we say
that si finds pj acceptable. Denote by Ai the set of projects that si finds acceptable.
Each lecturer lk offers a non-empty set of projects Pk, where P1, P2, . . . , Pq partitions
P . Let Bk = {si ∈ S : Pk ∩ Ai 6= ∅} (i.e. Bk is the set of students who find acceptable a
project offered by lk). Lecturer lk supplies a preference list, denoted by Lk, ranking Bk in
strict order. For any pj ∈ Pk, we denote by Ljk the projected preference list of lk for pj – this
is obtained from Lk by deleting those students who do not find pj acceptable. In this way,
the ranking of Ljk is inherited from Lk. Also, lk has a capacity constraint dk, indicating the
maximum number of students that he/she is willing to supervise. Similarly, each project
pj carries a capacity constraint cj , indicating the maximum number of students that could
be assigned to pj . We assume that max{cj : pj ∈ Pk} ≤ dk ≤
∑{cj : pj ∈ Pk}.
An example SPA instance is shown in Figure 1. Here the set of students is S =
{s1, s2, . . . , s7}, the set of projects is P = {p1, p2, . . . , p8} and the set of lecturers is L =
{l1, l2, l3}. As an example, the projected preference list of l1 for p1 comprises s1, s3, s2,
s5, ranked in that order.
An assignment M is a subset of S × P such that:
1. (si, pj) ∈M implies that pj ∈ Ai (i.e. si finds pj acceptable).
2. For each student si ∈ S, |{(si, pj) ∈M : pj ∈ P}| ≤ 1.
If (si, pj) ∈ M , we say that si is assigned to pj , and pj is assigned si. Hence Condition
2 states that each student is assigned to at most one project in M . For notational con-
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venience, if si is assigned in M to pj , we may also say that si is assigned to lk, and lk is
assigned si, where pj ∈ Pk.
For any student si ∈ S, if si is assigned in M to some project pj , we let M(si) denote
pj ; otherwise we say that si is unassigned in M . For any project pj ∈ P , we denote
by M(pj) the set of students assigned to pj in M . Project pj is under-subscribed, full or
over-subscribed according as |M(pj)| is less than, equal to, or greater than cj , respectively.
Similarly, for any lecturer lk ∈ L, we denote by M(lk) the set of students assigned to lk
in M . Lecturer lk is under-subscribed, full or over-subscribed according as |M(lk)| is less
than, equal to, or greater than dk respectively.
A matching M is an assignment such that:
3. For each project pj ∈ P , |M(pj)| ≤ cj .
4. For each lecturer lk ∈ L, |M(lk)| ≤ dk.
Hence Condition 3 stipulates that pj is assigned at most cj students inM , whilst Condition
4 requires that lk is assigned at most dk students in M .
A (student,project) pair (si, pj) ∈ (S × P )\M blocks a matching M if:
1. pj ∈ Ai (i.e. si finds pj acceptable).
2. Either si is unassigned in M , or si prefers pj to M(si).
3. Either
(a) pj is under-subscribed and lk is under-subscribed, or
(b) pj is under-subscribed, lk is full, and either si ∈ M(lk) or lk prefers si to the
worst student in M(lk), or
(c) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student in M(pj),
where lk is the lecturer who offers pj .
We call (si, pj) a blocking pair of M . A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair.
2.2 Consequences of the SPA problem definition
Our blocking pair definition in this paper attempts to encapsulate the various practical
scenarios in which si and lk could both simultaneously improve relative toM by permitting
an assignment between si and pj . For this to occur, si must find pj acceptable (Condition
1), and either be unassigned in M or prefer pj to M(si) (Condition 2). We now consider
lk’s perspective. In Condition 3(a), lk will co-operate if there was already a free place for
si. Similarly, in Condition 3(b), if lk is full and si was already assigned in M to a project
offered by lk, then lk agrees to the switch since the total number of students assigned to lk
remains the same, and pj has room for si. Alternatively, if lk is full and si was not already
assigned in M to a project offered by lk, then lk cannot take on si without first rejecting
some student assigned to lk. Lecturer lk would only agree to this switch if he/she prefers
si to the worst student assigned to lk in M , and project pj has room for si. Finally, we
consider Condition 3(c). If pj is full, then lk cannot take on si without first rejecting some
student assigned to pj . Lecturer lk would only agree to this switch if he/she prefers si to
the worst student assigned to pj in M . Notice that if si was already assigned in M to a
project offered by lk, then the number of students assigned to lk would decrease by 1 after
the switch; we revisit this point in Section 6.1.
We remark that HR is a special case of SPA in which m = q, cj = dj and Pj =
{pj} (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Essentially the projects and lecturers are indistinguishable in this
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case. In the HR setting, lecturers / projects are referred to as hospitals, and students are
referred to as residents. Linear-time algorithms are known for finding a stable matching,
given an instance of HR. The resident-oriented algorithm [12, Section 1.6.3] finds the
resident-optimal stable matching, in which each assigned resident is assigned to the best
hospital that he/she could obtain in any stable matching, whilst each unassigned resident is
unassigned in every stable matching. On the other hand, the hospital-oriented algorithm
[12, Section 1.6.2] finds the hospital-optimal stable matching M . Such a matching M
satisfies the property that there is no stable matching M ′ and hospital h for which h
prefers a resident in M ′(h)\M(h) to the worst resident in M(h).
The set of stable matchings in a given instance of HR satisfy several interesting prop-
erties that together form the Rural Hospitals Theorem [12, Theorem 1.6.4].
Theorem 2.1 (Rural Hospitals) For a given instance of HR, the following holds.
(i) Each hospital is assigned the same number of residents in all stable matchings [11].
(ii) Exactly the same set of residents are unassigned in all stable matchings [11].
(iii) Any hospital that is under-subscribed in one stable matching is assigned precisely the
same set of residents in all stable matchings [24].
In Section 4, we generalise parts of the Rural Hospitals Theorem to the SPA case, although
as we demonstrate, not all of the above properties carry over to SPA.
It is worth drawing attention to a special case of HR (and hence of SPA). This is the
classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI), where cj = 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
[10], [12, Section 1.4.2]. In this setting, residents are referred to as men and hospitals
are referred to as women. There exists a reduction from HR to SMI using the method
of ‘cloning’ hospitals. That is, replace each hospital hj , of capacity cj , with cj women,
denoted by h1j , h
2
j , . . . , h
cj
j . The preference list of h
k
j is identical to the preference list of hj .
Any occurrence of hj in a resident’s preference list should be replaced by h1j , h
2
j , . . . , h
cj
j
in that order. Hence in theory, the Gale/Shapley algorithm for SMI [12, Section 1.4.2]
could be used to solve an HR instance. However in practice direct algorithms are applied
to HR instances [12, Section 1.6], because the cloning technique increases the number of
hospitals (women) in a given HR instance by a potentially significant factor of C/m, where
C =
∑m
j=1 cj .
On the other hand there is no straightforward reduction involving cloning from an
instance of SPA to an instance of HR, due to the projects and lecturers being distinct
entities, each having capacity constraints. Even if such a reduction were possible, again it
would typically increase the number of lecturers (hospitals) by a significant factor. This
justifies the approach of this paper, in which we consider direct algorithms for SPA.
The two algorithms that we present are generalisations of the resident-oriented and
hospital-oriented algorithms for HR. The running time of each algorithm is O(λ), where λ
is the total length of the input preference lists, and hence is linear in the size of the problem
instance. This time complexity is optimal, since the Stable Marriage problem (SM) – the
special case of SMI in which m = n and each man finds every woman acceptable – is a
special case of SPA. A lower bound of Ω(λ) is known for SM [18], and hence this also
applies to SPA.
2.3 Related models in the literature
We now consider similarities between the SPA problem model and existing models for
two-sided matching problems that have been proposed in the literature.
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Recently Fleiner [7, 8] developed a matroid-theoretic characterisation of stable match-
ings in bipartite matching models. This is based on imposing two ordered partition ma-
troids, MA,MB, one on each side of a bipartite graph G. A matching is an independent
set that is common to both MA and MB. Moreover a stable matching corresponds to an
MAMB-kernel, and it is shown that such a structure is bound to exist [7, 8]. Fleiner [9]
noted that the SPA problem model may be included in this characterisation by imposing a
student matroid as a partition matroid, and a lecturer matroid as the truncation of a direct
sum of uniform matroids (thus ensuring that all project and lecturer capacities are satis-
fied). Here the vertices on one side of G correspond to students, the vertices on the other
side correspond to lecturers, and the edges correspond to acceptable (student,project)
pairs (so that G is in general a multigraph).
Also Eguchi et al. [6] formulated a model for two-sided matching problems in which
preferences are based on M\-concave functions, which arise in discrete convex analysis.
They gave an algorithm for finding a stable matching in such a context, however the algo-
rithm does not, in general, run in polynomial time for an arbitrary M\-concave function.
Their model includes the possibility of capacities and multiple partners; moreover since
linear orders gives rise to M\-concave functions, it follows that the model of Eguchi et al.
[6] includes SPA as a special case.
Our approach in this paper is to give specialised linear-time algorithms for SPA. As
the algorithms are described directly in terms of the SPA problem model, they should be
more intuitive and easier to implement in practical applications. Also, some structural
and optimality properties of the SPA problem model are derived (see Theorems 3.5, 4.1
and 5.5) which do not necessarily hold in the more general models mentioned.
3 Student-oriented algorithm for SPA
3.1 Overview of Algorithm SPA-student
We now present our first algorithm for SPA, starting with an overview of its operation.
The student-oriented algorithm for an instance of SPA involves a sequence of apply oper-
ations (i.e. students apply to projects). An apply operation is similar to a proposal in the
context of the Gale/Shapley algorithm for SM [10]. These operations lead to provisional
assignments between students, projects and lecturers; such assignments can subsequently
be broken during the algorithm’s execution. Also, throughout the execution, entries are
possibly deleted from the preference lists of students, and from the projected preference
lists of lecturers. We use the abbreviation delete (si, pj) to denote the operation of deleting
pj from the preference list of si, and deleting si from Ljk, where lk is the lecturer who offers
pj .
Initially all students are free, and all projects and lecturers are totally unsubscribed.
As long as there is some student si who is free and who has a non-empty list, si applies to
the first project pj on his/her list. We let lk be the lecturer who offers pj . Immediately,
si becomes provisionally assigned to pj (and to lk).
If pj is over-subscribed, then lk rejects the worst student sr assigned to pj . The pair
(sr, pj) will be deleted by the subsequent conditional that tests for pj being full. Similarly,
if lk is over-subscribed, then lk rejects his/her worst assigned student sr. The pair (sr, pt)
will be deleted by either of the two subsequent conditionals, where pt was the project most
recently assigned sr.
Regardless of whether any rejections occurred as a result of the two situations described
in the previous paragraph, we have two further (possibly non-disjoint) cases in which
deletions may occur. If pj is full, we let sr be the worst student assigned to pj (according
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SPA-student(I) {
assign each student to be free;
assign each project and lecturer to be totally unsubscribed;
while (some student si is free and si has a non-empty list) {
pj = first project on si’s list;
lk = lecturer who offers pj ;
/* si applies to pj */
provisionally assign si to pj ; /* and to lk */
if (pj is over-subscribed) {
sr = worst student assigned to pj ; /* according to Ljk */
break provisional assignment between sr and pj ;
}
else if (lk is over-subscribed) {
sr = worst student assigned to lk;
pt = project assigned sr;
break provisional assignment between sr and pt;
}
if (pj is full) {
sr = worst student assigned to pj ; /* according to Ljk */
for (each successor st of sr on Ljk)
delete (st, pj);
}
if (lk is full) {
sr = worst student assigned to lk;
for (each successor st of sr on Lk)
for (each project pu ∈ Pk ∩At)
delete (st, pu);
}
}
return {(si, pj) ∈ S × P : si is provisionally assigned to pj};
}
Figure 2: Pseudocode of Algorithm SPA-student.
to Ljk) and delete (st, pj) for each successor st of sr on Ljk. Similarly if lk is full, we let sr
be the worst student assigned to lk, and delete (st, pu) for each successor st of sr on Lk,
and for each project pu offered by lk that st finds acceptable.
The algorithm is described in pseudocode form in Figure 2 as Algorithm SPA-student.
We will prove that, once the main loop terminates, the assigned pairs constitute the stable
matching that is simultaneously best-possible for all students.
3.2 Correctness of Algorithm SPA-student
The correctness of the algorithm, together with the optimality property of the constructed
matching, may be established by the following sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 3.1 Algorithm SPA-student terminates with a matching.
Proof: Each loop iteration involves a free student si applying to the first project pj on
his/her preference list. No student can apply to the same project twice, since, for example,
once si is freed from pj , the pair (si, pj) is deleted. The total number of iterations is
therefore bounded by the overall length of the student preference lists. Finally, it is clear
that, once the main loop terminates, the assigned pairs constitute a matching.
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Lemma 3.2 No pair deleted during an execution of Algorithm SPA-student can block the
constructed matching.
Proof: Let E be an arbitrary execution of the algorithm in which some pair (si, pj) is
deleted. Suppose for a contradiction that (si, pj) blocks M , the matching generated by
E. Now (si, pj) is deleted in E because either (i) pj becomes full, or (ii) lk becomes full,
where lk is the lecturer offering pj . We will show that in Case (i), (si, pj) fails (a), (b)
and (c) of Condition 3 of a blocking pair. Case (ii) is easier: (si, pj) cannot block M ,
since once full, a lecturer never becomes under-subscribed, and is only ever assigned more
preferable students. We now deal with Case (i), and further consider the three sub-cases
of Condition 3 of a blocking pair.
(a) pj is under-subscribed and lk is under-subscribed.
Condition (a) requires that pj subsequently becomes under-subscribed – something
that can only happen if lk becomes over-subscribed and one of his/her assignments
involving pj is broken. However, it is not possible for lk to subsequently become
under-subscribed, contradicting the first clause of Condition (a).
(b) pj is under-subscribed, lk is full, and either si ∈ M(lk) or lk prefers si to the worst
student s′ in M(lk).
Condition (b) requires that pj becomes under-subscribed at some point after the
deletion of (si, pj). Let (s, pj) be the pair whose deletion by the over-subscribed lk
results in pj becoming under-subscribed. Now lk prefers s to si, and by Condition
(b), lk either prefers si to s′, or si = s′. It follows then that lk prefers s to s′, and
so, immediately after (s, pj) is deleted, the algorithm will ensure that (s′,M(s′)) is
also deleted. This is a contradiction, since M is a matching of undeleted pairs.
(c) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student s′ in M(pj).
Condition (c) gives us that lk prefers si to s′, and since (si, pj) is deleted, (s′, pj)
must also be deleted. This is a contradiction, since M is a matching of undeleted
pairs.
Lemma 3.3 Algorithm SPA-student generates a stable matching.
Proof: By Lemma 3.1, let M be the matching generated by an arbitrary execution E of
the algorithm, and let (si, pj) be any pair blocking M . We will show that (si, pj) must
be deleted in E, thereby contradicting Lemma 3.2. For, suppose not. Then si must be
assigned to some project M(si) 6= pj , for otherwise si is free with a non-empty preference
list (containing pj), thereby contradicting the fact that the algorithm terminates. Now
when si applies to M(si), M(si) is the first project on his/her list. Hence, (si, pj) must
be deleted, since for (si, pj) to block M , si must prefer pj to M(si).
For a given instance of SPA, we define a stable pair to be a (student,project) pair that
belongs to some stable matching. The next lemma shows that Algorithm SPA-student
never deletes a stable pair.
Lemma 3.4 No stable pair is deleted during an execution of Algorithm SPA-student.
Proof: Suppose for a contradiction that (si, pj) is the first stable pair deleted during an
arbitrary execution E of the algorithm. Let M be the matching immediately after the
deletion in E, and letM ′ be any stable matching containing (si, pj). Now (si, pj) is deleted
in E because either (i) pj becomes full, or (ii) lk becomes full, where lk is the lecturer
offering pj . We consider each case in turn.
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(i) Suppose that (si, pj) is deleted because pj becomes full during E. Immediately
after the deletion, pj is full, and lk prefers all students in M(pj) to si. Now, si ∈
M ′(pj)\M(pj), and since pj is full in M , there must be some s ∈ M(pj)\M ′(pj).
We will show that (s, pj) forms a blocking pair, contradicting the stability of M ′.
Firstly, since (si, pj) is the first stable pair deleted in E, s prefers pj to any of his/her
stable partners (except possibly for pj itself). Additionally, since (si, pj) ∈ M ′ and
lk prefers s to si, it follows that lk prefers s to both the worst student in M ′(pj) and
M ′(lk). Clearly then, for any combination of lk and pj being full or under-subscribed,
(s, pj) satisfies all the conditions to block M ′.
(ii) Suppose that (si, pj) is deleted because lk becomes full during E. Immediately after
the deletion, lk is full, and lk prefers all students in M(lk) to si. We consider two
cases: |M ′(pj)| > |M(pj)| and |M ′(pj)| ≤ |M(pj)|.
Suppose firstly that |M ′(pj)| > |M(pj)|. Since lk is full in M , there must be some
project p ∈ Pk\{pj} such that |M ′(p)| < |M(p)|. We remark that p is therefore
under-subscribed in M ′. Now let s be any student in M(p)\M ′(p). Since (si, pj)
is the first stable pair deleted, s prefers p to any of his/her stable partners (except
possibly for p itself). Also, lk prefers s to si, and hence to the worst student in
M ′(lk). So, in either case that lk is full or under-subscribed, (s, p) blocks M ′.
Now suppose that |M ′(pj)| ≤ |M(pj)|. Then since (si, pj) /∈ M , there is some
s 6= si ∈ M(pj)\M ′(pj). Now pj is under-subscribed in M , for otherwise (si, pj) is
deleted because pj becomes full, contradicting the assumption that deletion occurs
because lk becomes full. Therefore, pj is under-subscribed inM ′. As above, s prefers
pj to any of his/her stable partners (except possibly for pj itself), since (si, pj) is the
first stable pair deleted. Also, lk prefers s to si, and hence to the worst student in
M ′(lk). So, in either case that lk is full or under-subscribed, (s, pj) blocks M ′.
The following theorem collects together Lemmas 3.1-3.4.
Theorem 3.5 For a given instance of SPA, any execution of Algorithm SPA-student con-
structs the stable matching in which each assigned student is assigned to the best project
that he/she could obtain in any stable matching, whilst each unassigned student is unas-
signed in any stable matching.
Proof: By Lemma 3.3, let M be the stable matching generated by an arbitrary execution
E of the algorithm. In M , each student is assigned to the first project on his/her reduced
preference list, if any. Also, by Lemma 3.4, no stable pair is deleted during E. It follows
then that in M , each assigned student is assigned to the best project that he/she could
obtain in any stable matching, whilst any unassigned student is unassigned in any stable
matching.
Given the optimality property established by Theorem 3.5, we define the stable match-
ing returned by Algorithm SPA-student to be the student-optimal stable matching. For
example, in the SPA instance given by Figure 1, the student-optimal stable matching is
{(s1, p1), (s2, p5), (s3, p4), (s4, p2), (s7, p3)}.
In the next subsection, we show how to implement Algorithm SPA-student so that it
runs in linear time.
3.3 Analysis of Algorithm SPA-student
The algorithm’s time complexity depends on how efficiently we can execute ‘apply’ op-
erations and deletions, each of which occur at most once for any (student, project) pair.
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It turns out that both operations can be implemented to run in constant time, giving an
overall time complexity of Θ(λ), where λ is the total length of all the preference lists. We
briefly outline the non-trivial aspects of such an implementation.
For each student si, build an array, ranksi , where ranksi(pj) is the index of project pj
in si’s preference list. Represent si’s preference list by embedding doubly linked lists in an
array, preferencesi . For each project pj ∈ Ai, preferencesi(ranksi(pj)) stores the list node
containing pj . This node contains two next pointers (and two previous pointers) – one to
the next project in si’s list (after deletions, this project may not be located at the next
array position), and another pointer to the next project p′ in si’s list, where p′ and pj are
both offered by the same lecturer. Construct this list by traversing through si’s preference
list, using a temporary array to record the last project in the list offered by each lecturer.
Use virtual initialisation (described in [4, p.149]) for these arrays, since the overall Θ(nq)
initialisation cost may be super-linear in λ. Clearly, using these data structures, we can
find and delete a project from a given student in constant time, as well as efficiently delete
all projects offered by a given lecturer.
Represent each lecturer lk’s preference list Lk by an array preference lk , with an addi-
tional pointer, last lk . Initially, last lk stores the index of the last position in preference lk .
However, once lk is full, make last lk equivalent to lk’s worst assigned student through the
following method. Perform a backward linear traversal through preference lk , starting at
last lk , and continuing until lk’s worst assigned student is encountered (each student stores
a pointer to their assigned project, or a special null value if unassigned). All but the
last student on this traversal must be deleted, and so the cost of the traversal may be
attributed to the cost of the deletions in the student preference lists.
For each project pj offered by lk, construct a preference array corresponding to Ljk.
These project preference arrays are used in much the same way as the lecturer preference
array, with one exception. When a lecturer lk becomes over-subscribed, the algorithm
frees lk’s worst assigned student si and breaks the assignment of si to some project pj .
If pj was full, then it is now under-subscribed, and lastpj is no longer equivalent to pj ’s
worst assigned student. Rather than update lastpj immediately, which could be expensive,
wait until pj is full again. The update then involves the same backward linear traversal
described above for lk, although we must be careful not to delete pairs already deleted in
one of lk’s traversals. Since we only visit a student at most twice during these backward
traversals, once for the lecturer and once for the project, the asymptotic running time
remains linear.
The implementation issues discussed above lead to the following conclusion.
Theorem 3.6 Algorithm SPA-student may be implemented to run in Θ(λ) time and
O(mn) space, where λ is the total length of the preference lists, and n,m are the numbers
of students and projects respectively, in a given SPA instance.
4 Properties of stable matchings in an instance of SPA
In this section we consider properties of the set of stable matchings in a given instance of
SPA. We begin by proving a result similar to Theorem 2.1, the Rural Hospitals Theorem
for HR, in the context of a given SPA instance.
Theorem 4.1 For a given SPA instance, the following holds.
(i) Each lecturer has the same number of students in all stable matchings.
(ii) Exactly the same students are unassigned in all stable matchings.
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Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1 : p3 p1 p2 p4 l1 : s1 s2 l1 offers p1, p2
s2 : p1 p3 p2 p4 l2 : s2 s1 l2 offers p3, p4
Project capacities: ci = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ 4)
Lecturer capacities: di = 2 (1 ≤ i ≤ 2)
Figure 3: Instance I1 of the Student-Project Allocation problem.
(iii) A project offered by an under-subscribed lecturer has the same number of students in
all stable matchings.
Proof: Let M be the student-optimal stable matching, and let M ′ be any other stable
matching.
(i) Suppose |M ′(lk)| < |M(lk)| for some lecturer lk. There must be some project pj ∈ Pk
such that |M ′(pj)| < |M(pj)|. So, lk and pj are both under-subscribed in M ′. Also,
there exists si ∈ M(pj)\M ′(pj) who is unassigned in M ′ or prefers pj to M ′(si),
since M is student-optimal. Hence, (si, pj) blocks M ′, and, therefore, |M ′(lk)| ≥
|M(lk)| for all lk. It follows that |M ′| ≥ |M |. However, |M ′| ≤ |M |, since M is
student-optimal and therefore matches the maximum number of students of any
stable matching. Hence |M ′| = |M |, and for all lk, |M ′(lk)| = |M(lk)|.
(ii) Let U and U ′ be the sets of students unassigned in M and M ′ respectively. By
Theorem 3.5, U ⊆ U ′, since no student unassigned in M can be assigned in M ′. But
|U | = |U ′|, by (i), and so it follows that U = U ′.
(iii) Let lk be any lecturer who is under-subscribed in M ′. Suppose there is some project
pj ∈ Pk such that |M ′(pj)| < |M(pj)|. Then pj is under-subscribed in M ′, and
there exists si ∈ M(pj)\M ′(pj) who is unassigned in M ′ or prefers pj to M ′(si).
Hence, (si, pj) blocks M ′, and, therefore, |M ′(pj)| ≥ |M(pj)|. Now, by (i) above,
|M ′(lk)| = |M(lk)|, and so |M ′(pj)| = |M(pj)| for all pj ∈ Pk.
It turns out that two key properties of the Rural Hospitals Theorem for HR have no
analogue for SPA. Firstly, we give an instance of SPA illustrating that a lecturer who is
under-subscribed in one stable matching need not be assigned the same set of students in all
stable matchings. Note that the Rural Hospitals Theorem for HR states that any hospital
that is under-subscribed in one stable matching is assigned the same set of residents in
all stable matchings. However consider the SPA instance I1 shown in Figure 3. Instance
I1 admits the stable matchings M = {(s1, p3), (s2, p1)} and M ′ = {(s1, p1), (s2, p3)}.
Lecturer l1 is under-subscribed in M (and hence in M ′ by Part (i) of Theorem 4.1).
However M(l1) = {s2} whilst M ′(l1) = {s1}.
Secondly, we give an instance of SPA illustrating that a project offered by a lecturer
who is full in one stable matching need not be assigned the same number of students
in all stable matchings. Note that the Rural Hospitals Theorem for HR states that each
hospital is assigned the same number of residents in all stable matchings. However consider
the SPA instance I2 shown in Figure 4. Instance I2 admits the stable matchings M =
{(s1, p1), (s2, p1), (s3, p3), (s4, p3)} and M ′ = {(s1, p3), (s2, p4), (s3, p1), (s4, p2)}. Lecturer
l1 is full in M (and hence in M ′ by Part (i) of Theorem 4.1). However M(p1) = {s1, s2}
whilst M ′(p1) = {s3}.
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Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1 : p1 p3 p2 p4 l1 : s3 s4 s1 s2 l1 offers p1, p2
s2 : p1 p4 p3 p2 l2 : s1 s2 s3 s4 l2 offers p3, p4
s3 : p3 p1 p2 p4
s4 : p3 p2 p1 p4
Project capacities: c1 = 2, c2 = 1, c3 = 2, c4 = 1
Lecturer capacities: d1 = 2, d2 = 2
Figure 4: Instance I2 of the Student-Project Allocation problem.
Finally we consider the issue of load balancing project supervision among lecturers.
Theorem 4.1(i) might seem to imply that this issue is not relevant in our model. However
load balancing can be achieved if each lk ∈ L is constrained (for example by the Head
of Department) to set dk = dnq e (recall our assumption from Section 2 that
∑{cj : pj ∈
Pk} ≥ dk). Once Algorithm SPA-student has been run, the matched students would be
removed, any unmatched student would be invited to submit a longer preference list chosen
from the remaining under-subscribed projects, and the capacities of the under-subscribed
projects and lecturers would be suitably adjusted. Then a “second round” of the algorithm
could be used to assign the remaining students, ensuring that the students are distributed
equitably among the lecturers.
5 Lecturer-oriented algorithm for SPA
5.1 Overview of Algorithm SPA-lecturer
We now present the lecturer-oriented counterpart of Algorithm SPA-student. The lecturer-
oriented algorithm for an instance of SPA begins with the empty assignment, in which all
students are free, and every project and lecturer is totally unsubscribed. The algorithm
then enters a loop, each iteration of which involves an under-subscribed lecturer lk offering
a project pj ∈ Pk to a student si. Student si must be the first student on lk’s list who is
currently free or prefers an under-subscribed project in Pk to his/her current provisional
assignment. Additionally, pj must be the first such under-subscribed project from Pk
on si’s preference list. This offer is always accepted, and after breaking any existing
assignment involving si, si is provisionally assigned to pj and lk. Following this assignment,
any pair (si, p), where si prefers pj to p is deleted, which means that p is removed from
si’s preference list, and si is removed from the projected preference list of lr for p, where
lr is the lecturer who offers p. The algorithm continues in this loop until no such lk, pj
and si can be found.
The algorithm is described in pseudocode form in Figure 5 as Algorithm SPA-lecturer.
We will prove that, once the main loop terminates, the assigned pairs constitute the stable
matching that is simultaneously best-possible for all lecturers.
5.2 Correctness of Algorithm SPA-lecturer
The correctness of the algorithm, together with the optimality property of the constructed
matching, may be established by the following sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 5.1 Algorithm SPA-lecturer terminates with a matching.
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SPA-lecturer(I) {
assign each student, project and lecturer to be free;
while (some lecturer lk is under-subscribed and
there is some (student, project) pair (si, pj) where
si is not provisionally assigned to pj and
pj ∈ Pk is under-subscribed and si ∈ Ljk)
{
si = first such student on lk’s list;
pj = first such project on si’s list;
if (si is provisionally assigned to some project p)
break the provisional assignment between si and p;
/* lk offers pj to si */
provisionally assign si to pj ; /* and to lk*/
for each successor p of pj on si’s list
delete (si, p);
}
return {(si, pj) ∈ S × P : si is provisionally assigned to pj};
}
Figure 5: Pseudocode of Algorithm SPA-lecturer.
Proof: Each loop iteration involves a provisional assignment: either the first assignment
for a student, or an assignment that the student prefers to his/her previous assignment.
Therefore, the number of iterations is bounded by the total length of the student preference
lists, which is linear in the size of the input. Finally, it is clear that, once the main loop
terminates, the assigned pairs constitute a matching.
Lemma 5.2 No pair deleted during an execution of Algorithm SPA-lecturer can block the
constructed matching.
Proof: Let E be an arbitrary execution of the algorithm in which some pair (si, pj) is
deleted. Suppose for a contradiction that (si, pj) blocks M , the matching generated by
E. Now (si, pj) is deleted because si is provisionally assigned to some project p, where si
prefers p to pj . On subsequent iterations, si can only improve his/her assignment, and so,
by transitivity, si prefers his/her final assignment to pj . Therefore, (si, pj) cannot form a
blocking pair.
Lemma 5.3 A matching generated by Algorithm SPA-lecturer is stable.
Proof: By Lemma 5.1, let M be the matching generated by an arbitrary execution E of
the algorithm. Suppose for a contradiction that M is blocked by the pair (si, pj), where lk
is the lecturer offering pj . By Lemma 5.2, (si, pj) is not deleted, and so, upon termination
of E, si ∈ Ljk. Also, we have that (si, pj) must satisfy (a), (b) or (c) of Condition 3 for a
blocking pair. We show a contradiction in each case.
(a) pj is under-subscribed and lk is under-subscribed.
Student si, project pj and lecturer lk satisfy the loop condition, contradicting the
termination property established in Lemma 5.1.
(b) pj is under-subscribed, lk is full, and either si ∈ M(lk) or lk prefers si to the worst
student s′ in M(lk).
Let T be the point in the execution immediately after s′ obtains his/her final as-
signment p′ ∈ Pk, and all subsequent deletions involving s′ have occurred. Let M ′
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be the matching at time T , and let B = {s′} ∪ {s ∈ Bk : lk prefers s to s′}. Define
also the following set:
F =
{
p ∈ Pk : there exists a student sl ∈ B such that p ∈ Al,(sl, p) /∈M ′ and (sl, p) is not deleted before time T
}
.
The following properties of F must hold.
1. Any assignment in M involving lk that was made after time T must involve a
project from F , since s′ is the worst student in M(lk).
2. Every p ∈ F is full at time T , otherwise lk would not have offered p′ to s′.
3. pj ∈ F , since si ∈ B by Condition (b), and (si, pj) is not deleted by Lemma
5.2, which implies that (si, pj) /∈M ′, since (si, pj) /∈M .
Now since pj ∈ F , the number of students assigned to lk in M ′ is given by
|M ′(lk)| =
∑
pf∈F\{pj}
|M ′(pf )|+ |M ′(pj)|+
∑
pg∈Pk\F
|M ′(pg)| ≤ dk. (1)
Similarly, the number of students assigned to lk in M is given by
|M(lk)| =
∑
pf∈F\{pj}
|M(pf )|+ |M(pj)|+
∑
pg∈Pk\F
|M(pg)|.
Now, since all assignments in M involving lk that were made after time T only
involve projects from F (Property 1) and all projects in F are full in M ′ (Property
2), we have that
|M(lk)| ≤
∑
pf∈F\{pj}
|M ′(pf )|+ |M(pj)|+
∑
pg∈Pk\F
|M ′(pg)|.
Finally, we are given that pj is under-subscribed at the termination of E (Condition
(b)). Therefore
|M(lk)| <
∑
pf∈F\{pj}
|M ′(pf )|+ |M ′(pj)|+
∑
pg∈Pk\F
|M ′(pg)|
= |M ′(lk)| ≤ dk
by Equation 1. So, lk is under-subscribed at the termination of E, contradicting
Condition (b).
(c) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student s′ assigned to pj .
We have that lk prefers si to s′, and so at the time lk offered pj to s′, (si, pj) must
have been deleted (otherwise lk would have offered pj to si). This is a contradiction,
since by Lemma 5.2, (si, pj) blocks M only if it is not deleted.
Lemma 5.4 No stable pair is deleted during an execution of Algorithm SPA-lecturer.
Proof: Suppose, for a contradiction, that (si, pj) is the first stable pair deleted during an
arbitrary execution E of the algorithm. Let M be a stable matching containing (si, pj).
The deletion of (si, pj) during E occurs because si is provisionally assigned to a project
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Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1 : p3 p1 l1 : s1 s2 s3 s4 l1 offers p1, p2
s2 : p1 p3 l2 : s2 s1 s4 s3 l2 offers p3, p4
s3 : p4 p2 Project capacities: ci = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ 4)
s4 : p2 p4 Lecturer capacities: di = 2 (1 ≤ i ≤ 2)
Figure 6: A SPA instance to illustrate that lecturer optimality differs from that in HR.
p′, where si prefers p′ to pj . Let l′ be the lecturer offering p′, and let c′ and d′ be the
capacities of p′ and l′ respectively.
The number of stable pairs (s′, p′) for which l′ prefers s′ to si must be less than c′,
for otherwise, one of these pairs must be deleted before si is assigned to p′ during E,
contradicting the assumption that (si, pj) is the first stable pair deleted in E. Therefore
in M , since (si, p′) /∈ M , either (i) p′ is under-subscribed, or (ii) p′ is full and assigned a
student inferior to si.
We will prove that (si, p′) blocks M . Firstly, we have that si prefers p′ to pj , and
so (si, p′) satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 of a blocking pair. It remains to show that (si, p′)
satisfies Condition 3(a), (b) or (c) of a blocking pair. If (ii) above holds, then (si, p′)
satisfies Condition 3(c). Otherwise, (i) holds, and p′ is under-subscribed in M .
If l′ is under-subscribed in M , then (si, p′) satisfies Condition 3(a). Otherwise l′ is full
in M , and the only way (si, p′) cannot satisfy Condition 3(b) is if l′ is assigned d′ students
in M , each of whom he/she prefers to si. We will show a contradiction for this case.
SinceM is a stable matching, each of these d′ assignments forms a stable pair. Now, for
l′ to offer p′ to si in E, only 0 ≤ z < d′ of these stable pairs are assigned (since l′ must be
under-subscribed to make an offer). However, none of the d′ stable pairs is deleted before
the offer to si in E, for otherwise (si, pj) is not the first stable pair deleted. So, it must be
the case that for the d′−z unassigned stable pairs in E, each of the projects in these pairs
is full (otherwise, the next offer from l′ in E would involve one of the unassigned stable
pairs, not si and p′). But then l′ is full when the offer of p′ is made to si in E, giving the
required contradiction.
In the Hospitals / Residents problem, the hospital-oriented algorithm generates a stable
matching M that is unequivocally optimal for the hospitals – as mentioned in Section 2.2,
M satisfies the property that there is no stable matching M ′ and hospital h for which h
prefers a resident in M ′(h)\M(h) to the worst resident in M(h). On the other hand, M
is the worst possible stable matching for the residents – no stable matching assigns any
resident to a worse hospital.
In our context, the stable matching produced by Algorithm SPA-lecturer is again
unequivocally student-pessimal. However, the optimality situation is a little different. It
can again be viewed as lecturer-optimal in a precise, if somewhat less emphatic sense.
In the example instance of Figure 6, the matchingM = {(s1, p1), (s2, p3), (s3, p2), (s4, p4)}
is produced by an execution of Algorithm SPA-lecturer. However the matching M ′ =
{(s1, p3), (s2, p1), (s3, p4), (s4, p2)} is also stable. In M ′, each lecturer is assigned a student
whom he/she prefers to one of the students whom he/she is assigned in M . Hence it is
not the case that, in M , either lecturer is assigned the best two students that he/she can
be assigned in any stable matching.
The somewhat weaker form of optimality that applies in this context can be described
as follows. Let M and M ′ be two stable matchings for a given instance of SPA. By
Theorem 4.1, we know that |M | = |M ′| and |M(lk)| = |M ′(lk)|. For a given lecturer lk
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who is assigned different sets of students in M and M ′, let
M(lk) \M ′(lk) = {s1, . . . , sr}
and
M ′(lk) \M(lk) = {s′1, . . . , s′r},
where, in each case, the students are enumerated in the order in which they appear in Lk.
If lk prefers si to s′i for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) we say that lk prefers M to M ′. Alternatively, and
equivalently, lk prefers M to M ′ if there is a one-to-one mapping f from M ′(lk) \M(lk)
to M(lk) \M ′(lk) with the property that lk prefers f(s) to s for all s.
The following theorem summarises the key properties of the stable matching resulting
from any execution of Algorithm SPA-lecturer.
Theorem 5.5 For a given instance of SPA, any execution of Algorithm SPA-lecturer
constructs the stable matching M satisfying the following properties.
(i) Each student is unassigned or is assigned to the worst project he/she has in any stable
matching.
(ii) Each project pj is assigned the first xj students not deleted from the projected preference
list for pj (where xj is an integer independent of execution).
(iii) Each lecturer prefers M to any stable matching in which he/she has a different set of
assigned students.
Proof:
(i) Let si be any student assigned in M . Algorithm SPA-lecturer deletes all successors
of M(si) from si’s preference list. Now, by Lemma 5.4, no stable pair is deleted, and
so si can have no worse partner than M(si) in any stable matching. Hence, each
student is either unassigned in M , and therefore in any stable matching (Theorem
4.1), or assigned to the worst project that he/she has in any stable matching.
(ii) Suppose there is some (student, project) pair (si, pj) /∈M , such that si is not deleted
from Ljk, where lk is the lecturer offering pj , and lk prefers si to the worst student s′
in M(pj). Since (si, pj) is not deleted in E, si is either unassigned in M , or prefers
pj to M(si). So, (si, pj) is a blocking pair, contradicting the stability of M .
(iii) Let M ′ be any other stable matching, and let lk be an arbitrary lecturer who is
assigned different sets of students inM andM ′. We construct a one-to-one mapping
f from M ′(lk) \M(lk) to M(lk) \M ′(lk) with the required property.
Define a student s ∈ M ′(lk) \M(lk) to be a dominated student in Lk if lk prefers
every student in M(lk) to s. For each such student s we have a free choice for
f(s). So we can complete the one-to-one mapping arbitrarily by dealing with these
students once f has been defined for the other students in M ′(lk) \M(lk).
So let si1 be a student in M
′(lk) \M(lk) who is preferred by lk to at least one of the
students in M(lk), and suppose that (si1 , pj1) ∈M ′, where lk offers pj1 . By part (i)
above, si1 prefers pj1 to the project to which he/she is assigned in M . So to avoid
(si1 , pj1) being a blocking pair for M , either
– pj1 is fully subscribed inM with students whom lk prefers to si1 ; let si2 be such
a student who is in M(pj1) \M ′(pj1); or
– pj1 is under-subscribed in M but lk is fully subscribed in M with students
preferable to si1 .
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However, we may reject the second possibility in view of our assumption that si1 is
not dominated in Lk, so we can consider the student si2 .
If si2 6∈ M ′(lk) we let f(si1) = si2 . Otherwise, by (i) above, there is a project pj2
offered by lk such that (si2 , pj2) ∈ M ′ \M , where si2 prefers pj2 to pj1 . To avoid
(si2 , pj2) being a blocking pair forM , pj2 must be fully subscribed inM with students
whom lk prefers to si2 ; let si3 be such a student who is in M(pj2) \M ′(pj2). (Note
that, since lk prefers si2 to si1 , and therefore cannot prefer all the students in M(lk)
to si2 , we may again ignore the other possibility.)
If si3 6∈ M ′(lk) we let f(si1) = si3 . Otherwise we continue in this way to generate
a sequence si4 , . . . , sit of students, each member of which is preferred by lk to its
predecessor. Since the number of students is finite, this sequence must terminate
with a student sit ∈ M(lk) \ M ′(lk) such that lk prefers sit to si1 , and we set
f(si1) = sit .
The sequence si1 , . . . , sit is such that
– si1 ∈M ′(lk) \M(lk)
– sir ∈M ′(lk) ∩M(lk) for 1 < r < t
– sit ∈M(lk) \M ′(lk)
– lk prefers sir to sir−1 for 1 < r ≤ t.
Additionally, we need to ensure that, if the same project occurs in the sequences
originating with more than one of the students in M ′(lk) \M(lk), we can choose a
unique student matched to that project inM ′ \M on each occasion. For, suppose px
is such a project that arises r times from pairs (su1 , px), . . . , (sur , px) ∈M ′ \M . So,
arguing as before, px must be fully subscribed in M with students whom lk prefers
to all of su1 , . . . , sur . Clearly there must be at least r such students from which to
choose, and a different one can be chosen in each sequence.
Finally, as indicated earlier, we complete the one-to-one mapping f in an arbitrary
way for the dominated students. Hence f is, as claimed, a one-to-one mapping from
M ′(lk)\M(lk) to M(lk)\M ′(lk) with the property that lk prefers f(s) to s for all s.
Hence lk prefersM toM ′. The argument may be repeated for each relevant lecturer,
and the result follows.
In the next subsection, we show how to implement Algorithm SPA-lecturer so that it
runs in linear time.
5.3 Analysis of Algorithm SPA-lecturer
Even with the specialised data structures described in Section 3.3, it is not immediately
clear whether Algorithm SPA-lecturer can be implemented to run in linear time. Consider
for example the execution trace in Figure 7.
The sequence of offers made by l1, i.e. 〈(s2, p1), (s1, p2), (s4, p3), (s1, p1), (s3, p2)〉,
highlights two major differences between Algorithm SPA-lecturer and the hospital-oriented
algorithm for HR. Firstly, a lecturer can make more than one offer to the same student
(l1 offers both p2 and p1 to s1), and secondly, a lecturer may not make offers in order of
preference (l1 offers p3 to s4 before s3 is made an offer).
Of course, the reason for these differences is that a project and lecturer can become
under-subscribed after being full. For example, in step (ii) of the execution, p1 is full, and
so s1 is assigned to his/her second preference, p2. This makes p2 full, which means that l1
is not immediately able to make an offer to s3. However, in step (iv), s2 accepts a more
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Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1 : p1 p2 l1 : s2 s1 s3 s4 s5 l1 offers p1, p2, p3
s2 : p4 p1 l2 : s2 l2 offers p4
s3 : p2
s4 : p3 Project capacities: ci = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ 4)
s5 : p1 p2 p3 Lecturer capacities: d1 = 3, d2 = 1
(i) l1 offers p1 to s2; p1 becomes full;
(ii) l1 offers p2 to s1; p2 becomes full;
(iii) l1 offers p3 to s4; l1 and p3 become full;
(iv) l2 offers p4 to s2; l2 and p4 become full; s2 is freed from p1; l1 and p1 become
under-subscribed; (s2, p1) is deleted;
(v) l1 offers p1 to s1; p1 becomes full; s1 is freed from p2; p2 becomes under-subscribed;
(s1, p2) is deleted;
(vi) l1 offers p2 to s3; l1 and p2 become full.
Figure 7: A SPA instance I, together with an execution trace of Algorithm SPA-lecturer
as applied to I.
preferable project, thereby freeing p1 for s1, which in turn frees p2 for s3. Also l1 was full
just after step (iii), but under-subscribed just after step (iv).
The main problem then is how to efficiently find the next student to whom a given
lecturer lk can make an offer (since Pk may contain several projects that have become
under-subscribed). It turns out that we can overcome this problem by restricting the
non-deterministic choice of lk in the main loop of Algorithm SPA-lecturer. Consider the
implementation given in Figure 8.
For each lecturer lk, we maintain a pointer next lk , which initially refers to the first
student in Lk. Also, for each project pj ∈ Pk, we maintain a pointer nextpj , which
initially refers to the first student in Ljk. In the implementation, lk repeatedly makes an
offer to next lk , which moves left to right through Lk, advancing one student at a time. If
next lk is already provisionally assigned to some project p
′ and lecturer l′, project p′ may
become under-subscribed having previously been full (since next lk leaves p
′). At this point,
the next offer made by l′ can only involve one of two students - next l′ , or nextp′ , where
nextp′ is maintained as the first student not assigned to p′ on the projected preference
list of l′ for p′. If nextp′ is defined, and either nextl′ is undefined or l′ prefers nextp′ to
nextl′ , we require that l′ makes an offer to nextp′ in the next loop iteration. Alternatively,
if l′ prefers next l′ to nextp′ , student nextp′ is in the scope of the variable nextl′ , and so
l′ can revert to making offers to nextl′ as usual. By making this decision when there are
only two possibilities (nextp′ and next l′), we avoid the problem of choosing among several
students when l′ next makes an offer.
We briefly outline the other data structures used in the linear-time implementation.
For each student si, we construct an array preferencesi , the kth element of which is the
kth-ranked post in si’s preference list. Additionally, as in Algorithm SPA-student, we use
next and previous pointers to link together the projects in this list that are offered by a
given lecturer. When a lecturer lk makes an offer to si, we can follow these pointers to
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SPA-lecturer(I) {
assign each student, project and lecturer to be free;
assign p to be undefined;
let S be a stack consisting of all lecturers;
while (S 6= ∅) {
/* we seek a provisional assignment of student si to project pj and lecturer lk */
if (p is defined) { /* p has just become under-subscribed */
pj = p;
lk = lecturer offering pj ;
si = nextpj ;
assign p to be undefined;
} else {
lk = S.pop();
if (lk is full or next lk is undefined)
continue; /* to the next loop iteration */
si = next lk ;
advance next lk by one student;
S.push(lk);
if (si’s list contains no under-subscribed project in Pk)
continue; /* to the next loop iteration */
pj = first such project on si’s list;
}
advance nextpj by one student;
if (si is provisionally assigned to some project p′ and lecturer l′) {
if (p′ is full and nextp′ is defined and
(next l′ is undefined or l′ prefers nextp′ to next l′))
p = p′;
break provisional assignment between si, p′ and l′;
}
provisionally assign si to pj and lk;
for (each successor p′ of pj on si’s list) {
if (si == nextp′)
advance nextp′ by one student;
delete (si, p′);
}
}
return {(si, pj) ∈ S × P : si is provisionally assigned to pj};
}
Figure 8: Implementation of Algorithm SPA-lecturer.
find the first under-subscribed project from Pk in si’s list. Such a traversal happens at
most once for each lecturer, and so no project in si’s preference list is visited more than
a constant number of times. We also remark that all successors of a given project can be
deleted from si’s preference list simply by traversing the underlying array.
For each lecturer lk, we build an array, rank lk , where rank lk(si) is the index of student
si in Lk. We represent Lk by an array, preference lk , where preference lk(rank lk(si)) stores
student si. Each lecturer lk also stores a count of the number of students whom they are
provisionally assigned, and a pointer next lk into preference lk , as described earlier.
For each project pj offered by lk, we build an array rankpj , where rankpj (si) is the
index of student si in Ljk. We represent Ljk by embedding a doubly-linked list in an
array preferencepj . For each student si ∈ Ljk, preferencepj (rankpj (si)) stores the list node
containing si. This node has a pointer to the next student in Ljk, and one to the previous
student in Ljk. Each project also stores a count of the number of students whom it is
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provisionally assigned, and a pointer nextpj into preferencepj , as described earlier.
Using these data structures, we can find and delete a student from a project’s preference
list in constant time. For each preference list, we can also compare the ranks of any
two students, and efficiently traverse through the sequence of students, missing out any
students that have been deleted.
The above discussion therefore leads to the following result.
Theorem 5.6 Algorithm SPA-lecturer may be implemented to run in Θ(λ) time and
O(mn) space, where λ is the total length of the preference lists, and n,m are the numbers
of students and projects respectively, in a given SPA instance.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1 Discussion of the SPA problem model
The definition of a blocking pair (si, pj) considered in this paper includes the possibility
that si was already assigned inM to a project offered by lk, where lk is the lecturer offering
pj , and seeks to become assigned to a preferred project pj offered by the same lecturer.
Such a switch obviously cannot alter the total number of students assigned to lk.
If pj is under-subscribed in M , then pj has room for si, and lk is implicitly indifferent
about the switch, so would not prevent it from taking place. However if pj is full in M ,
then the only way that the switch could occur is if lk rejects a student from pj . Moreover,
lk would agree to such a switch only if lk prefers si to the worst student s′ assigned to pj
in M . But this implies that, following the rejection of s′, the number of students assigned
to lk would decrease by 1 if s′ is unable to move to a worse project offered by lk.
The following small SPA instance illustrates this phenomenon. We have two students,
s1, s2, two projects, p1, p2, and one lecturer, l1. Each of p1 and p2 has capacity 1, whilst l1
has capacity 2. Student s1 prefers p1 to p2, whilst s2 finds only p1 acceptable. Lecturer l1
prefers s1 to s2. Clearly then, the matching M1 = {(s1, p2), (s2, p1)} admits the blocking
pair (s1, p1), whilst M2 = {(s1, p1)} is the only stable matching.
In going from M1 to M2, we satisfy the blocking pair (s1, p1); however in doing so, l1
loses a student, so in practice he/she may not agree to the switch. Hence one could alter
Condition 3(c) of the blocking pair definition to prevent a change such as this from taking
place. However we make two counter-arguments.
Firstly, by allowing a matching such as M1 to be stable, we introduce an element of
strategy into the problem. That is, it could be in a student’s interest to submit a shorter
preference list in order to obtain a more preferable project, rather than to submit his/her
true preferences. For example, in the above instance, s1 could list only p1. In doing so, s1
would be assigned to p1 under either definition of Condition 3(c). On the other hand, by
not listing every project that he/she finds acceptable, a student assumes a greater risk of
being unassigned in the final matching.
Secondly, allowing bothM1 andM2 to be stable would imply that this instance admits
stable matchings of different sizes. Hence, to match as many students as possible, we would
seek a maximum cardinality stable matching. However we conjecture that this problem
is NP-hard. Evidence for this is given by the apparent lack of structure in this case:
if both M1 and M2 are stable, there is no student-optimal stable matching. This is in
contrast with the structure that follows from the definition of Condition 3(c) as adopted
in this paper. In this context we have been able to prove several desirable properties
of SPA, including an analogue of the Rural Hospitals Theorem (Theorem 4.1), and the
existence of student-optimal and lecturer-optimal stable matchings (Theorems 3.5 and 5.5
respectively). With stable matching problems in general, it is often the case [12] that
20
the existence of structural properties and efficient algorithms are closely related to one
another.
6.2 Open problems
In this paper we introduced SPA, and studied this problem from an algorithmic and
structural point of view. A number of interesting open problems remain, including the
following:
• Clearly many different formulations of the SPA model are possible. If only students
supply preference lists, then a matching that optimises the students’ satisfaction
may be constructed using network flow techniques (see [1] for further details). Addi-
tionally, as in this paper, lecturers may supply preference lists, but over the projects
that they offer rather than over students. We have considered this model from
an algorithmic viewpoint – see [17] for further details. Finally, lecturers may have
preferences over (student,project) pairs. In this setting, Fleiner [9] noted that the
matroid-theoretic characterisation as described in Section 2.3 is applicable if a cer-
tain stability definition is imposed. However with this definition of stability there
are strategic issues similar to those outlined in the previous subsection. It remains
open as to whether a stability definition for this case can be formulated that leads
to efficient algorithms, whilst avoiding such issues of strategy.
• If we allow ties in the preference lists of students and lecturers, different stability
definitions are possible. These can be obtained by extending three stability defini-
tions that have been applied to the Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties [13, 14].
Under the weakest of these stability criteria, so-called weak stability, every instance
of SPA with ties admits a stable matching (this follows by breaking the ties arbi-
trarily and applying Algorithm SPA-student to the resulting instance of SPA, for
example). However such matchings could be of different sizes for a given SPA in-
stance with ties, and the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable matching is
NP-hard (this follows by restriction, since the same problem has been shown to be
NP-hard in the case of SMI with ties [16]). Under the two stronger stability criteria,
namely strong stability and super-stability, an instance of SPA with ties need not
admit a matching satisfying either criterion. However it remains open to construct
algorithms for finding such a matching in each case, or reporting that none exists,
for a given instance of SPA with ties.
• A further natural extension arises when each project pj carries a lower bound xj ≥ 0.
That is, pj cannot run unless at least xj students are assigned to it. Clearly a stable
matching need not exist that satisfies all the projects’ lower bounds. If lower bounds
were present for hospitals in the case of HR, the problem of deciding whether a stable
matching exists that satisfies them would be trivial, in view of the Rural Hospitals
Theorem (i.e. find one stable matching, and if it does not satisfy the lower bounds,
then no other stable matching does). However in view of the discussion following
Theorem 4.1, the same is not true in the case of SPA. It is open as to whether there
exists a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a stable matching if one exists, given
an instance of SPA with lower bounds for the projects.
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